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Raúl Prebisch
and the development agenda
at the dawn of the
twenty-first century
The hundredth anniversary of the birth of Raúl Prebisch
is an invaluable opportunity for us to take another look
at the ideas of this great Latin American, one of the
thinkers from the developing world who has had the
strongest influence in world economic debates. His
ideas have been the subject of heavy criticism, but much
of this has been based on distorted versions of his
thinking or of its practical application, rather than his
true intellectual work. Taking his proposals out of their
historical context has also been a frequent practice, even
by some of his own followers. It should be remembered,
in particular, that many of his proposals were made in
the light of the collapse of the international trade and
financial system in the 1930s, whose reconstruction had
barely begun when he published his most influential
works (Prebisch, 1949, 1951 and 1952).
This essay tries to show that some of the basic ideas
in Prebisch’s thinking remain valid, and it reformulates
them as a function of ECLAC’s most recent proposals
and the contributions of other schools of economic
thought.
José Antonio Ocampo*
1. Three main elements in Prebisch’s thinking
“The spread of technical progress from the countries
where it had its source to the rest of the world has been
… relatively slow and irregular” (Prebisch, 1951, p. 3).
This assertion, which forms the opening words of what
is perhaps his best-known work, has two fundamental
methodological implications. The first is the recognition
of the key role of technical progress in economic growth
and, hence, the importance for the developing countries
of the channels through which that progress is
transmitted from the “countries of origin”: the derived
demand for raw materials; technology transfer proper,
including technology embodied in production
equipment; the transfer to the developing countries of
branches of production which are already “mature” in
the industrialized countries, and the participation of
developing countries in sectors of rapid technological
progress. The second is the impossibility of analysing
the dynamics of developing countries independently
of their position within the world economy. Their
development processes are qualitatively different from
those of the most advanced nations. This means that
there are no uniform “stages of development” and that
“late development” –or “peripheral capitalism”, to use
Prebisch’s own term– has a dynamic which is quite
different from that of nations which developed earlier
and became the “centre” of the world economy.1
* Executive Secretary of ECLAC (jaocampo@eclac.cl). This paper
was presented at the seminar on development theory at the dawn
of the 21st century, organized by ECLAC to commemorate the
hundredth anniversary of the birth of Raúl Prebisch. The author
wishes to express his thanks to Oscar Altimir, María Elisa Bernal,
María Angela Parra and Rosemary Thorp for their valuable
comments on an earlier version.
1
 The best analysis of these points of view is undoubtedly that of
Furtado (1961).
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This is the view which underlies the idea of an
inherently hierarchical “centre-periphery” world
economic system (or “North-South”, if we prefer the
terminology which gained currency in the debates of
the 1970s). The essence of this view is its emphasis on
the basic asymmetries characterizing the world
economy, and their persistence over time, in contrast
with the perception of the world economy as a place of
relations between equals, or a “level playing field”, to
use a concept which has been in vogue in recent years.
In terms of the recent controversies on economic
growth, this alternative view of the world economy
means that these asymmetries give rise to “divergence”
in levels of development, or at the very least represent
a serious obstacle to the “convergence” assumed in
orthodox economic growth theory.2
These asymmetries are reflected primarily in the
structure of production. According to a version which
is very close to Prebisch’s thinking, “unlike the
production structure of the periphery, which is
specialized and heterogeneous, that of the centres is
diversified and homogeneous” (Rodríguez, 2001,
p. 105). As technical change originates in the centre
countries and they also have higher consumption
capacity, at any given moment they tend to have a
concentration of the branches of production which are
most dynamic at the world level. In Prebisch’s view,
this gives rise to a tendency towards specialization by
the industrialized countries in products of high income
elasticity, while the countries on the periphery tend to
concentrate on the production of goods of low income
elasticity (raw materials and, increasingly, the
manufacture of mature goods), which in turn reflects a
trend towards divergence of growth rates and /or the
rise of balance of payments problems in the latter
countries, i.e., an external gap or bottleneck. These
problems are particularly severe at times of crisis,
reflecting the high cyclical vulnerability of the
developing countries to shocks coming from the centre
of the world economy.
In Prebisch’s view, overcoming the basic
asymmetries of the international system requires not
only a change in the international economic structure,
but also an effort to transform the structures of the
peripheral countries themselves -“development from
within”, to use Prebisch’s original terminology, as
recovered by Sunkel (ed., 1991). In terms of the more
recent debates, this “development from within” is
essential because the accumulation of national human
capital and technological capacity (“knowledge
capital”) and institutional development are essentially
endogenous processes. This explains the decisive
importance of “programming development”, which was
a term used in the first stages of ECLAC’s work and, in
general, designing explicit State strategies to change
the internal structures of the country, in order to break
down the obstacles to development and make possible
new forms of integration into the world economy.
Industrialization was initially seen as the main way
of changing the production structure –“spreading
technical progress”– and import substitution as its main
instrument. This view was in keeping with the
characteristics of the period when these ideas were
formulated: the absence of a dynamic international
market for manufactures;3 the “empirical” way in which
the import substitution strategy had arisen, as a response
to the collapse of the international economy in the
1930s; and the protectionist past which many Latin
American countries had shared with the United States
and various countries on the European continent, even
during the stage of primary-export development.4 The
possibilities of inefficiency in import substitution,
especially in highly fragmented markets, as well as the
need to ensure that industrialization was not carried
out at the expense of agriculture or export development,
were evident to Prebisch even in his earliest publications
in ECLAC (Prebisch, 1949, sections I and VI). Therefore,
from the late 1950s on, Prebisch and ECLAC began to
advocate a “mixed model”5 which combined import
substitution with the promotion of new exports,
especially of industrial origin.6 Over time, ECLAC’s view
became increasingly pro-export, although it never
2
 In this formulation we are leaving aside the controversy over the
terms of trade, which has been given an excessive amount of
attention in the analysis of Prebisch’s work. We therefore
concentrate on the divergence in levels of development or –in terms
of the controversy in question– the role played by the deterioration
in the factorial terms of trade. See, in this respect, Ocampo (1991).
3
 “No emphasis was placed on exports of manufactures to the centres
in this stage, in view of the unfavourable conditions prevailing in
those countries and the absence of a suitable industrial infrastructure
for this” (Prebisch, 1987, p. 17).
4
 For more details of Latin American protectionism during the
export stage, see Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp (eds., 2000a,
chap. 1). For a comparison of Latin American tariffs with those of
a number of Western European countries and the United States,
see Maddison (1989, pp. 45-47).
5
 This is the term used in a recent study on economic history
(Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp, eds., 2000b, chap. 1).
6
 This coincides with what Prebisch called the third stage in his
thinking (Prebisch, 1987, pp. 9-21). One of its clearest expressions
is to be found in Prebisch, 1963.
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favoured the abrupt elimination of protection
arrangements.7
For Prebisch, the industrialization of the peripheral
countries also involved a further problem: modern
industry was less able to absorb the surplus labour made
available by the rural sector. This fact was further
aggravated by technological dependence, which meant
that “best practices” corresponded to patterns of labour
use dictated by the levels of development of the
industrialized countries. One way or another, patterns
of development came to be marked by greater
“structural heterogeneity” of the productive sectors, to
use the term coined later by Pinto (1970): while some
workers were absorbed by the high-productivity sectors,
a generally much large proportion were relegated to
low-productivity sectors. This high level of domestic
heterogeneity was one of the basic forces exerting
adverse pressures on income distribution, and moreover,
in the case of Latin America, this took place in countries
which had already inherited a high degree of inequality
and marked social segmentation from their previous
stages of development.
Under the mixed development strategy, integration
processes were seen, from the early 1950s on, as key
elements for rationalizing the costs of import
substitution: both those associated with the absence of
competition and those due to the inefficiency deriving
from the sub-optimal scale of the industrial plants. A
decade later, when the possibilities of exporting
manufactures to the industrialized countries began to
be perceived, they were likewise seen as a means of
building up export experience, as a prelude to winning
other markets. Regional integration –the various
subregional processes, LAFTA/LAIA, and the Latin
American common market, which was the most
ambitious project– thus became a decisive element in
the “mixed model” advocated by Prebisch and ECLAC
from the late 1950s (ECLAC, 1959). Thus, it was seen
as a way of expanding the spaces within which
“development from within” could take place, in order
to make it more efficient.
The asymmetrical features characteristic of the
“centre-periphery” system, the need to adopt active
“development from within” strategies (including those
designed to deal with the special problems caused by
“structural heterogeneity”) and the critically important
role of regional integration are thus three central
elements in Prebisch’s thinking. In the rest of this paper
I shall seek to show their ongoing importance in the
development agenda of this dawning twenty-first
century.
2. International asymmetries
The tendency towards the further expansion of
inequalities has been a persistent feature of the world
economy for the last two centuries. Empirical studies
show that convergence of per capita income levels has
been a relatively rare occurrence and has been limited
in fact to the most highly industrialized countries in
the period after the Second World War and, in particular,
during the 1950-1973 “Golden Age”. It was not a
feature of the industrialized countries before that war
(Maddison, 1991), nor has it been a feature of the
developing countries since then (Ros, 2000, chap. 1).
There have been episodes of rapid growth in the
developing world in certain periods, however. In fact,
Latin America was the fastest-growing region in the
world between the two world wars, and some Asian
countries have led the world in growth in some periods
after the Second World War: the oil-producing countries
of the Middle East, the “Asian Tigers”, and China and
India in different sub-periods (Maddison, 1995). Except
in the case of Japan, however, these processes have not
brought about convergence with the patterns of
development of the industrialized world, and in most
cases they have now been interrupted. It may be added
that even within Latin America there is no clear
tendency towards convergence: the inequalities which
grew up a century or so ago have tended to persist over
time (Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp, eds., 2000a,
chap. 1, and 2000b, chap. 1).
The persistence and even accentuation of these
international inequalities has occurred despite the
impressive industrialization process registered by the
developing countries in the last half-century (and even
earlier in Latin America). This process has been
reflected in greater diversification of the structure of
7
 See, in this respect, three recent versions of the history of ECLAC
thinking: Bielschowsky (1998), ECLAC (1998) and Rosenthal (2001).
The reasons for this view (now mainly of historical interest) were
based on three considerations: i) the transmission costs that the
elimination of protection arrangements would cause; ii) the idea
that the structure of export incentives could be rationalized to offset
the costs of protection, and iii) the belief that there was some degree
of complementarity between protection and export development;
in particular, where economies of scale existed, the local market
served as a “base” for winning foreign markets (an argument that
Krugman, 1990, chap. 12, subsequently called “import substitution
as export promotion”). Prebisch and ECLAC always acknowledged,
however, that high levels of protection could give rise to inefficiency
and insoluble anti-export biases.
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production of the developing world, except in the most
backward areas. Serious imbalances have persisted,
however, in the structure of production at the world
level: there is a high degree of concentration of technical
progress in the centre countries, which has determined
their sources of competitiveness; they have continued
to dominate the world in the production of machinery
and equipment, and they also continue to predominate
in the make-up of the great transnational corporations.
The most important consequence of the imbalances
in the world economy is that the economic opportunities
of the developing countries continue to be largely
determined by their place within this international
hierarchy. There has undoubtedly been some “spread
of technical progress” from the centre, through the
channels already mentioned. In the words of Prebisch,
however, this spread has continued to be “relatively
slow and irregular”, and its benefits have been
distributed unequally among the developing countries,
thus maintaining or even accentuating their “structural
heterogeneity”. Within the context of the “moving
target” represented by the world technological frontier
(Pérez, 2001), only a few countries –and few sectors
and enterprises within them– manage to move faster
and thus reduce their technology lag; many others only
manage to more or less keep up with the advance of
the frontier, and quite a few fall back.8
Furthermore, the vulnerability of the developing
countries to external shocks continues to be very high
and has even tended to worsen with the growing
integration of the world economy. The nature of this
vulnerability has been changing over the last half-
century, however. Although the transmission of external
shocks through trade –both directly, through lower
sales, and indirectly, through the cyclical deterioration
in the terms of trade– has continued to be important,
financial shocks have now taken on the leading role,
repeating patterns which had already been observed in
the past in many Latin American countries, especially
during the financial boom and bust of the 1920s and
1930s.
This vulnerability is the result of basic imbalances
in the financial structures and in macroeconomic
dynamics, especially the depth of financial development
and the degree of macroeconomic autonomy of the
countries (Ocampo, 2001c). There are four basic
financial asymmetries: i) the disparity between the size
of the financial markets of the developing countries and
the speculative pressures they face;9 ii) the nature of
the currencies in which the external debt is
denominated; iii) the structures of maturities provided
by the financial markets, and iv) the scope of the
secondary markets. These last three characteristics
mean that in developing countries, those agents who
have access to international markets (the government
and large firms) are subject to currency mismatches,
while those who do not have such access (small firms)
are subject to maturity mismatches, but it is generally
impossible to secure a financial structure which
simultaneously obviates both these risks. All in all, this
means that the financial markets of developing countries
are much more “incomplete” than the international
markets, so that part of the financial intermediation must
necessarily take place through the international market.
It also means that international financial integration is
integration between unequal partners.10
The macroeconomic asymmetries, for their part,
are associated with the fact that the international
currencies are those of the industrialized countries and
with the nature of capital flows: whereas the capital
flows among developed countries are of a counter-
cyclical nature (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000), those
between developed and developing countries are clearly
pro-cyclical. This behaviour is connected with the
residual nature of capital flows to developing countries
or, to use the terms coined by Palma (2001), the fact
that the latter countries are “debtors of last resort”.
The overall result of these factors is that whereas
the industrialized countries have more leeway for
adopting counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies –and
this leeway is even greater in the case of the United
States than in the other industrialized economies, since
the U.S. dollar is the main international currency–,
which thus gives rise to a stabilizing response from the
financial markets, in contrast the economies of the
developing countries largely lack such leeway, since
the financial markets tend to accentuate the cycles and
the market actors expect the authorities to behave in a
pro-cyclical manner. Looking back over the past, this
has meant that whereas the industrialized countries were
largely able to free themselves from the rules of the
gold standard, those rules continue to determine the
macroeconomic behaviour of the developing countries
and have even become increasingly influential in this
8
 For recent information on this topic, with regard to Latin America,
see Katz (2000) and ECLAC (2001a).
9
 See, for example, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, chap. III.
10
 ECLAC, 2000, chap. 8, and Studart, 1996.
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respect. Thus, the macroeconomic imbalances between
the centre and the periphery which were characteristic
of the gold standard era (Triffin, 1968; Aceña and Reis,
eds., 2000) have been further aggravated. Although
multilateral arrangements –especially the intervention
of the International Monetary Fund– provide short-term
relief, they are aimed at ensuring the adoption of
austerity measures during crises: a “depression
(macro)economics”, to use the expression of Krugman
(1999). To be more specific, the characteristic feature
of the economies of the developing countries is the
alternation of boom and depression macroeconomics
(ECLAC, 2000, chap. 8, and 2001b).
There is also a further asymmetry in the
international economy which is associated with the
contrast between the growing mobility of capital and
the restrictions on the international mobility of labour,
especially less-skilled labour. As Rodrik (1997) has
indicated, asymmetries in the international mobility of
the different factors of production give rise to pressures
in income distribution which favour the most mobile
factors and adversely affect the less mobile ones. These
imbalances have a “centre-periphery” component in that
the developing countries have a relative abundance of
the least mobile factors of production: unskilled labour
and natural resources. Indeed, the absence of
international mobility of labour was seen by Prebisch
(1951) as a basic flaw in the international economy
which played an essential role in the tendency towards
the deterioration of the terms of trade of the developing
countries.
Finally, it should be added that the international
economy is also marked by basic imperfections which
are of a “systemic” rather than a “centre-periphery”
nature. The first of these is the contrast between the
rapid development of markets and the lag in building
global governance, which has led to a sub-optimal
supply of “global public goods” (Kaul, Grunberg and
Stern, eds., 1999). The second is the enormous
difference between the rapid globalization of some
markets and the flagrant absence of a true international
social agenda or, more precisely, the lack of effective
international instruments to ensure the fulfillment of
the development goals which are periodically reiterated,
most recently in the United Nations Millennium
Declaration. The third is the incompleteness of the
international agenda, which also has, to some extent,
“centre-periphery” dimensions, in view of the absence
of issues of great interest to the developing countries,
such as international mobility of labour or the more
rapid opening-up by the developed countries of markets
which are of great interest to the developing nations
(Ocampo, 2001a).
The analysis thus indicates that the global agenda
should include “systemic” issues, connected with the
supply of “global public goods”, as well as those
connected with the correction of the existing
international asymmetries. These “centre-periphery”
issues fundamentally involve correction of the
asymmetries in the fields of production and technology,
the financial and macroeconomic asymmetries which
are responsible for the high degree of cyclical
vulnerability of the developing countries, and those
associated with the different degrees of international
mobility of the factors of production.
After the establishment of UNCTAD, under the direct
influence of Prebisch,11 there was explicit recognition
of the need to correct the imbalances which marked,
and continue to mark, the international economic
system. The pledges with regard to official development
assistance and “special and differentiated treatment”
for the developing countries in trade were among the
partial, albeit relatively frustrating, results of this effort
to construct a “new international economic order”. In
recent decades, however, this approach has been
seriously eroded (ECLAC, 2001c, chap. VIII) and has
been replaced with an alternative model whereby the
basic goal in reordering the international economy
should be to ensure a “level playing field” to guarantee
the efficient functioning of the free market forces. In
this new scheme, the main benefits for the developing
countries lie in the eventual dismantling of the
industrialized countries’ protection of “sensitive”
sectors, the guarantees offered for export development
by an international trade framework with clear and
stable rules, and the design of preventive
macroeconomic policies which will serve as automatic
protection against international financial volatility. In
this approach, the aim of correcting international
imbalances is only maintained in terms of the
acknowledgement of international responsibility vis-
à-vis the least developed countries, thus repeating at
the international level the idea that social policy should
be a strategy designed to target State action on the
poorest sectors.
Although all these actions are desirable, will they
be sufficient in themselves to give rise to greater
convergence of development levels? In view of the
foregoing considerations, the answer may be no. This
11
 See, for example, his first report to UNCTAD (Prebisch, 1964).
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agenda does not address the asymmetries which tend
to generate divergences in development patterns.
Moreover, ensuring a “level playing field” implies
imposing restrictions on the developing countries,
especially the middle-income ones, which the
industrialized countries themselves never faced in
earlier periods of their history: standards of intellectual
property protection typical of countries that generate
technology, and limitations on the adoption of policies
designed to promote new sectors of production, whether
for the domestic market or for export (Chang, 2001).
Finally, the problems generated by a manifestly
incomplete set of international financial institutions,
together with the policy of less intervention in financial
markets in order to avoid “moral hazard” and the
measures designed to reduce the risks run by large
financial agents (the higher risk weighting proposed in
the new Basle Committee bank regulation criteria), may
end up by helping to “solve” the problem of capital
account volatility in the most undesirable way: by
bringing about an excessive rise in the cost of external
indebtedness for the developing countries and thus
possibly leading to a permanent reduction in capital
flows to them.
In these circumstances, the design of a balanced
international agenda inevitably calls for the correction
of the imperfections in the international economic
system through action in three areas: i) the application
of mechanisms to speed up the “spread of technical
progress” from the centre by different forms of “special
and differentiated treatment”; ii) efforts by the
international financial institutions to increase the
developing countries’ leeway for adopting counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies, to check the
concentration of credit by placing resources at the
disposal of countries and agents which do not have
access to credit on private international markets, and
to speed up the financial development of the developing
countries, as the only way of offsetting in the long term
the imbalances that mark the international financial
system, and iii) to ensure that international mobility of
labour receives the same attention on the global agenda
as the international mobility of capital.
3. Development from within
In Prebisch’s view, the importance of action to correct
the imbalances characterizing the international
economic system necessarily involved recognition of
the equally important role of the policies adopted by
the developing countries themselves to transform their
economic and social structures. Correcting those
imbalances would help to establish an “enabling
environment” for the efforts to generate “development
from within”.
It is now generally recognized, at the institutional
level, that a development strategy must help to generate
solid social compacts which will ensure political
stability; non-discretional legal systems and forms of
behaviour of the agents which will make contracts
secure; and an impartial and sufficiently efficient State
bureaucracy. Although these institutional frameworks
serve as the backdrop for the development process,
however, they do not explain the concrete growth
impulses that economies receive, nor their exhaustion.12
These impulses are related more directly with the
matters mentioned in the previous sections: the
reduction of macroeconomic and financial
vulnerability, the rate of change of the structure of
production, and the connections between growth
patterns and equity, especially the “structural
heterogeneity” of the productive sectors.
a) Reducing macroeconomic and financial
vulnerability
As already noted, the emphasis in the first of these fields
has been shifting from trade-related matters, on which
Prebisch largely concentrated his attention, to those of
financial origin. In this respect, Latin America’s
experience in recent decades makes it possible to
deduce some “stylized facts” which should be borne in
mind for designing better macroeconomic policies
(ECLAC, 2000 and 2001b; Ffrench-Davis, 1999;
Ocampo, 2000):
i) There is no simple definition of macroeconomic
stability. The return to fiscal discipline and low rates
of inflation has not been reflected in greater stability
in real terms, that is to say, in GDP growth and greater
employment. Nor has it been reflected in better
results in the external accounts, since private deficits
have not been kept under control. Consequently,
concern for the soundness of the fiscal accounts must
be accompanied by measures to prevent the
accumulation of unsustainable private deficits.
ii) Real stability is also costly. It gives rise to defensive
strategies by firms, which put off their investment
12
 In the terminology used by Maddison (1991), they refer to the
ultimate causes rather than the immediate causes of economic
growth. See also Ocampo (2001b).
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decisions, thus causing adverse effects on
economic growth. In downward phases of the cycle
there are also irreversible losses of both tangible
and intangible business assets (“tacit”
technological and organizational know-how, trade
contacts, reputation of the firm), especially when
those phases are accompanied by financial crises.
For these reasons, there is an inverse relation
between economic growth and real instability. As
we shall see below, serious social imbalances are
also generated during the cycle.
iii) In financial matters, balance sheets are just as
important as flows. Financial crises have been
originated not only by unsustainable current
account deficits, but also by unsuitable financial
structures in the public and especially the private
sectors: that is to say, structures which have an
excessive proportion of short-term liabilities or are
open to risks from higher interest rates or rates of
devaluation.
iv) In the absence of a fiscal policy with a medium- or
long-term horizon, backed up by suitable
institutions (stabilization funds), keeping fiscal
deficits low is really a pro-cyclical policy approach.
It encourages expansion of spending during boom
periods on the basis of transitory public revenue.
Subsequently, however, the cuts made due to short-
term falls in revenue aggravate crises and thus lead
to further reduction of public sector revenues.
v) In the developing countries, monetary policy
autonomy is limited under all exchange-rate
regimes. This fact has always been recognized in
connection with fixed or semi-fixed exchange-rate
systems, but in fact the same thing occurs when
interest rates are managed in a pro-cyclical manner
in flexible exchange-rate regimes in order to avoid
exchange rate fluctuations. In view of the vital role
played by the exchange rate in open economies
–it is a determinant both of competitiveness and
of price levels– some degree of intervention in
foreign exchange markets may be necessary, but
pro-cyclical management of interest rates is
undoubtedly the wrong road to follow. For this
reason, in spite of its limitations prudential
regulation of capital flows can do a lot to increase
the autonomy of monetary policy.
vi) Credibility is not necessarily attained by the use
of “automatic pilots”. If capital flows are pro-
cyclical, explicit renunciation of monetary policy
autonomy (as for example by adopting systems
based on a currency board or the use of a foreign
currency as an anchor) can result in more severe
economic cycles. In that case, it is quite possible
that the market may not validate the hypothetical
increase in “credibility” by reducing the country
risk accordingly. Furthermore, the country loses
some degree of freedom to cope with external or
domestic shocks. In both cases, the private agents
may question the sustainability of the rules
themselves and the high costs of breaking them.
Prudent management of macroeconomic flexibility
may therefore be a better way, in the long run, to
build up greater policy credibility than the adoption
of excessively rigid rules.
These lessons indicate that the concept of
macroeconomic stability should be expanded to include
not only price stability and the maintenance of low fiscal
deficits, but also stability of economic growth rates,
employment, the external accounts and the national
financial systems, as well as the use of pluriannual
horizons in fiscal policy design. They also mean that it
must be recognized that the authorities are faced with
complex dilemmas in seeking to ensure macroeconomic
stability in this broad sense of the term, since there is
no simple, straightforward association between its
different components.
The most promising approach in order to achieve
this result would appear to be to pragmatically combine
three sets of policies. The first of these is made up of
consistent but flexible macroeconomic policies –fiscal,
monetary and exchange-rate– designed to prevent the
public and private agents from building up heavy debts,
to avoid the generation of imbalances in the most
important macroeconomic prices (the exchange rate and
interest rates) and in the prices of fixed assets and
securities in boom periods, and to facilitate reactivation
in the event of crises. The second is a stringent system
of prudential regulation and supervision of financial
systems, with a clear counter-cyclical orientation, which
provides for stricter rules in periods of financial
euphoria in order to counteract the increasing risks run
by intermediaries at such times. The third element is a
“liability policy” designed to ensure that a suitable
profile of internal and eternal debt maturities is
maintained in the public and private sectors (ECLAC,
2000, chap. 8; Ocampo, 2000).
Prudential regulation of the capital account, applied
in periods of euphoria in order to prevent over-
indebtedness, can play a vital role as a “liability policy”,
promoting an external finance structure in which long-
term liabilities predominate, but also, as already noted,
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as an instrument designed to give monetary policy more
leeway to adopt counter-cyclical policies. In the long
term, however, the main instrument for breaking the
asymmetries typical of the international financial
system, which are accompanied by the pro-cyclical
macroeconomic performance of the developing
countries, is deeper financial development in those
countries which will ensure suitable development of
the long-term segments of the market and of the
corresponding secondary securities markets.
Applying counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies
is no easy task, since the international financial markets
generate strong incentives to over-spend during periods
of financial euphoria and over-adjust during crises. For
this reason, counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies
of the developing countries must be backed up by
suitable international institutions. In particular,
international financial institutions must take on the
essential function of offsetting the pro-cyclical effect
of the financial markets, damping down financial cycles
from their source by suitable regulation in the
industrialized countries, and must also give the
countries more leeway to adopt counter-cyclical
policies, both through suitable surveillance and
incentives to reduce macroeconomic and financial risks
at times of euphoria, and through mechanisms to soften
adjustments when there are sudden interruptions in
capital flows (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000; Ocampo,
2001c).
b) Dynamic changes in production patterns
Greater macroeconomic stability, even in the broad
sense in which we have defined this term, is a necessary
but not of itself sufficient condition for rapid economic
growth. This is precisely what the various historical
variants of structuralist economic thinking, to which
Prebisch belongs, are trying to get across when they
emphasize that different economic sectors have very
different capacities to “spread technical progress” and,
ultimately, boost the economy, generating a strong
interaction between structural change, investment and
economic growth. In this view, the leading role played
by some sectors and companies, which form the
“dynamic nucleus” at any given point in time, is the
essential element in economic growth.
Many schools of thought have analysed the features
of these structural dynamics. Some of them have noted
that, because of the complementarity (linkages)
between production firms and sectors, the
macroeconomic and distributional effects of the growth
of a sector can give a strong boost to the growth process
or, alternatively, halt it (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943;
Taylor, 1991; Ros, 2000). These sectoral dynamics can
give rise to successive phases of imbalance, as noted
by Hirschman (1961). Technological dynamics can also
give rise to processes of “creative destruction”, to use
the terminology of Schumpeter (1962, chap. VIII).
Since technical knowledge, and indeed knowledge in
general, is not transmitted through detailed manuals,
the growth path of firms involves an intense adaptation
and learning process which is intrinsically linked with
the experience acquired in the production process and
largely determines the capacity for the accumulation
of technical, commercial and organizational know-how
(Katz, 1976; Amsden, 2001).
Although other formulations could be used, one
which captures the essence of structural dynamics
centres on two fundamental concepts: i) innovations
and the associated learning processes, and ii) the
development of production linkages (ECLAC, 2000,
chap. 9; Ocampo, 2001b). In this context, “innovation”
must be considered to cover every new way of doing
things: not only new technologies, but also the
development of new sectors or products, new marketing
strategies, and the opening of new markets. In the
developing countries, many of these “innovations” are
associated with the successful adaptation of
technologies and activities developed earlier in the
industrialized world, in this case through import
substitution and/or export promotion. All innovations,
in this broad sense of the term, involve learning and
dissemination processes, many of them marked by the
generation of dynamic economies of scale. This also
applies to technological innovation and the development
of new productive sectors, as well as new marketing
networks, in which such economies are associated with
the reduction of transaction costs over time. The second
concept highlights the role of the externalities which
the economic agents and sectors generate among
themselves (Hirschman, 1961) and which determine the
degree of “systemic competitiveness” of the relevant
production structures (ECLAC, 1990).
These ideas have been used recently by a number
of authors to bring out the need for a production
development strategy as a fundamental ingredient of a
dynamic developing economy, a long-standing subject
in the literature on “late industrialization”. In line with
an old tradition in industrial policy, Chang (1994) has
highlighted the importance of lowering the
“coordination costs” associated with the development
of new sectors subject to substantial complementarities.
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Rodrik (1999) has pointed out the importance of a
“national investment strategy” which would make it
possible to give an initial boost to growth, while ECLAC
(2000) refers to the need to adopt a structural change
strategy. Amsden (2001), for his part, has emphasized
the crucial importance of close collaboration between
the State and the business sector and the need for
“mutual control mechanisms” which establish a link
between incentives and results, so that incentives do
not simply become a source of “rent-seeking”.
This interpretation brings out one of the most
important characteristics of successful cases of
development in the past: a strong industrialization drive
based on firm and close collaboration between the State
and the private sector. Can it be that the opening-up of
markets will do away with the need for active
production development policies?
The results obtained so far in Latin America are
not very encouraging in this regard as  in the last decade
of the twentieth century, the fastest export growth in
the economic history of the region was accompanied
by only mediocre economic growth. The “destructive”
elements deriving from the disintegration of domestic
production linkages and national innovation systems
have been stronger than the opportunities generated by
the expansion of transnational corporations or export
development patterns which make highly intensive use
of imported inputs or natural resources (ECLAC, 2001a).
Figure 1 sums up this situation, showing that the
economic growth rate in the 1990s was over two
percentage points lower than that of the 1950s to 1970s,
but gave rise to a trade deficit similar to that of the
1970s and higher than that of the two earlier decades.
Furthermore, as noted in UNCTAD (1999, chap. IV), this
adverse shift in the relation between economic growth
and the trade balance is virtually universal in the
developing world.
All this emphasizes the importance of combining
macroeconomic stability, in the broad sense, with an
active production development strategy. According to
the foregoing considerations, the two essential elements
of such a strategy are: i) to speed up the rate of
innovation, including the transfer of technology, the
development of new production sectors and the
conquest of new markets, and to support the learning
processes involved in all these processes; and ii) to
promote the reduction of coordination costs in order to
exploit the synergies between enterprises and
production sectors which help to generate “systemic
competitiveness”. This policy requires a considerable
institutional and organizational effort in order to
develop the right instruments for today’s open
economies, with a view to playing an active part in
international markets. These efforts will have to be all
the greater to the extent that the old intervention
arrangements have been dismantled or significantly
weakened during the liberalization phase of the
economies in question.
A policy of this type also requires that the
international community should recognize that such
strategies are an essential component for dynamic
growth of the developing countries. In the light of the
problems currently being faced by those countries in
seeking to bring about a dynamic change in production
patterns, this means that “special and differentiated
treatment” must be given in three areas: i) intellectual
property protection schemes which help to promote the
transfer of technology; ii) temporary promotional
arrangements for import substitution industries; and
iii) especially in the present conditions, temporary
promotional arrangements for new exports (“infant
export industries”), through the use of incentives
designed to diversify the exportable supply and
mechanisms to make it possible to increase the national
content of exports (for example, through sectoral
agreements backed up by agreements on export
performance). All this obviously means seeking the
right instruments to ensure that these mechanisms do
not give rise to sterile competition among countries to
attract industries that are candidates for relocation.
c) The effects of economic changes on equity
The deep significance of Prebisch’s observations on the
difficulties that industrialization has faced in the developing
countries in general, and in Latin America in particular, in
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absorbing labour is shown in figure 2. Both at the
beginning (1950) and the end (1980) of the most rapid
industrialization phase, the share of industrial employment
in total employment in Latin America was nearly ten
percentage points smaller than that which had been
displayed by the countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) when
(about half a century earlier) they were at the same levels
of per capita GDP. Excess labour was absorbed first by the
rural sector, but by 1980 the majority of the labour force
was employed in urban services. In the light of the form
of absorption of excess labour that characterized the mid
twentieth century, Prebisch (1951) associated that
phenomenon with the deterioration of commodity prices.
Three decades later, it had become a source of pressure
on urban income distribution in Latin America.
The concept of “structural heterogeneity”
developed by Pinto (1970) to take account of this
phenomenon is undoubtedly preferable to the traditional
concept of “dualism”, because the heterogeneity
characteristic of developing countries and societies
cannot be described simply in terms of the contrast
between a “modern sector” and a “traditional sector”,
since low-productivity sectors are constantly arising and
changing, and only a few segments that lag behind can
be defined as “traditional”. This is what happened in
Latin America in the 1990s: the region generated more
“world-class” firms (many of them subsidiaries of
transnational corporations) capable of successfully
integrating into the world economy, but at the same
time there was an increase in low-productivity activities,
which absorbed seven out of every ten urban workers
(ECLAC, 2001a and 2001d).
Structural heterogeneity means that there are no
automatic mechanisms which will ensure that rapid
technological innovation in dynamic sectors will
promote general economic growth. In the absence of
suitable internal linkages, or when the “destructive”
effects of production restructuring and the defensive
microeconomic strategies that accompany them are
predominant, structural heterogeneity can even become
more pronounced. If this happens, the effects on
economic growth will only be weak and there will be
still further pressures on employment and equity (see
for example Taylor and Vos, 2001).
The linkages between the modernized dynamic
sectors and the rest of the economy are therefore
important not only for growth but also for equity.
Production development strategies can play a
fundamental role in promoting such linkages. The
evidence also shows that good distribution of assets
which gives rise to a universe of solid small enterprises
is associated with better income distribution and less
concentration of power in general. Policies designed
to democratize the access of small urban and rural
producers to production assets –capital, technology,
training and land– are therefore of the greatest
importance, both in terms of growth and of equity.
In addition to these linkages of a structural nature,
there are also others associated with macroeconomic
volatility: the serious asymmetries in the social effects
of business cycles. Thus, in the downward phases of
cycles jobs are destroyed and there is an increase in
poverty, but when the economy returns to the pre-crisis
level of per capita GDP, this does not necessarily mean
that there is a return to the previous levels of
unemployment or poverty. This is certainly what Latin
American history of the last two decades shows:
although in the mid-1990s per capita GDP returned to
the levels of before the debt crisis, even by the end of
FIGURE 2
Sectoral structure of employment: Latin America 1950-1980 and OECD 1870-1950
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the decade the pre-crisis levels of poverty had still not
been restored. It may be added that at the level of the
individual, unemployment has a permanent effect on
workers’ careers: the loss of working experience,
reputation and connections means that when workers
find employment again they earn significantly lower
wages or else are only able to enter the labour market
again through self-employment activities (ECLAC,
2001d). The problems are obviously even more serious
when the need to contribute to the family’s income
forces young people to abandon their studies, thus
permanently affecting their future careers. Furthermore,
when there are no institutions to protect workers against
unemployment, unstable demand for labour is in itself
costly in social terms.
These interconnections of economic growth
patterns with equity highlight a basic fact: equity
undoubtedly depends on very active social policy, but
it does not depend solely on that. The rate and stability
of economic growth are also important, and so too in
particular is the way in which patterns of change in the
production sector help to reduce or increase “structural
heterogeneity”. For this reason, even ambitious efforts
in the field of education will be futile unless there is
dynamic generation of good-quality jobs. When this is
absent, the hypothetical connections between human
capital accumulation and growth do not materialize,
and instead there is still greater “educational
devaluation” (occupation of the same jobs by persons
of a higher educational level) or emigration of well-
educated labour abroad.
The persistent and even increasing levels of urban
informal employment and the increase in non-
permanent jobs clearly show the importance of
universal, solidary and integral social security policies
which include measures to incorporate informal-sector
workers and (depending on the degree of development
of the countries concerned) to advance towards the
provision of unemployment insurance. It is also
important to initiate arrangements to promote greater
adaptation of the labour force to technological change
and to business cycles, so that unemployment will not
be the basic means of adjustment: especially
arrangements that combine aggressive labour training
policies with a “social dialogue” at the national, sectoral
or enterprise level in order to restructure production
sectors within a framework of stable employment
(ECLAC, 2000, chap. 5). Social safety nets and
permanent schemes for the timely initiation of
emergency employment programmes should be viewed,
in this context, as intermediate arrangements that should
develop, in the long term, into integral social security
systems.
The above-mentioned interconnections also show
the importance of designing integrated policy
frameworks. One of the weakest points in this respect
is the lack of institutions that facilitate this. In the last
two decades there has even been a tendency to
strengthen the macroeconomic institutions
disproportionately, not only over the social institutions
but also over those responsible for production
development policies. It is therefore necessary to
radically reorient the institutional schemes in order to
build up systems which make possible coordination
between the economic and social authorities, in which
social priorities are incorporated as a central part of
economic policy design, and which make visible both
the immediate and the structural social effects of
economic policies.
It should be noted that the foregoing considerations
do not of course cover all the positive linkages that can
exist between equity and development: apart from the
interactions between human capital and good-quality
employment and the beneficial effects of better
distribution of production assets, there are also
favourable economic policy linkages, positive effects
on the capital market, and links between social
cohesion, investment and productivity. The relations
between equity and development were one of the
favourite subjects of the development literature of the
1960s, and fortunately they have also come to occupy
a leading place in recent economic debate (see for
example Ros, 2000, chap. 10). It may be noted,
however, that not all connections are positive. Thus,
Prebisch’s later work (Prebisch, 1976, 1981 and 1987)
is full of reflections, based on the Latin American
experience of those years, on the way in which pressure
on wage levels and public expenditure can generate
forms of macroeconomic instability which end up by
interrupting economic growth.
4. Regional integration
In the classical views of integration associated with
Prebisch’s thinking, the history of Latin American
integration holds a double paradox. On the one hand,
the protectionist forces which prevailed in the region
in the 1960s and 1970s gave rise to integration processes
which fundamentally restricted their scope to non-
competitive sectors. Thus, one of the fundamental
virtues of integration, the rationalization of import
substitution (ECLAC, 1959), was only achieved to a very
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limited extent. Moreover, during the debt crisis of the
1980s the regional integration schemes were on the
point of collapsing because of the generalized use of
protection and competitive devaluation as means of
adjusting the economies.
The vigour displayed by the regional integration
process from the late 1980s on was likewise
paradoxical, for in the most orthodox views that
dominated development concepts at that time
integration was seen as a source of distortion of trade
flows. The fact that unilateral trade openness coincided
with the revitalization of regional integration was
therefore a belated concession to the views which had
served to justify regional integration in previous periods
and, in particular, to the idea that integration was a
source of creation rather than diversion of trade and,
moreover, a source of trade flows with a greater content
of technology than those resulting from unilateral
openness.
These virtues have in fact materialized in practice.
Thus, the growth of intra-regional trade was extremely
vigorous between 1990 and 1997, especially in the two
South American integration agreements –MERCOSUR
and the Andean Community– where such trade grew
by a factor of 5 and 4.2, respectively, during those years.
As a result, there was a reversal of the historical situation
whereby the intensity of intra-regional trade was greater
for the smaller economies. By 1997, the greatest relative
intra-regional trade flows were in MERCOSUR. All the
regional integration agreements still have a long way
to go, however, if the yardstick is the European Union,
where intra-regional trade has represented around 60%
of total trade in recent decades. It should also be noted
that intra-regional trade suffered a pronounced drop
with the Asian crisis. The hardest-hit flows were those
among South American countries, but these recovered
strongly in the year 2000. This indicates that the
elasticity of such trade to economic activity is now very
high (ECLAC, 2001c).
Furthermore, the intra-regional trade flows consist
to a substantial extent of manufacturing goods,
especially those of higher technological content. This
pattern is particularly evident if we exclude Mexico,
whose sales of manufactures to the United States have
grown rapidly since the signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement. In 1999, for example, 81% of
intra-regional exports corresponded to manufactures,
compared with 65% of total external sales (excluding
Mexico). The contrast is even greater when only non-
traditional products are included. In this case, intra-
regional trade then absorbed 35% of exports of
manufactures, concentrated in products with the highest
content of technology.
The view that there is a relation of complementarity
between general trade openness processes and
integration was branded by ECLAC (1994) as “open
regionalism”. This complementarity indicates that, in
spite of the advances made in information and
communications, external economies and economies
of scale (including economies of specialization) and
the transaction costs associated with geographical
distance continue to be substantial. The latter include
not only transport costs, but also those associated with
the establishment of trade networks, especially those
involving small and medium-sized firms. Regional
processes also make it possible to advance further in
the harmonization of the rules affecting economic
activity and to promote deeper economic relations
which also have effects on trade. This is why regional
networks create additional trade, over and above that
created through unilateral trade openness.
It should be noted, however, that the new
regionalism differs from similar efforts made in the past
because of the increased number of areas of action
involved and the scope of tariff liberalization.
Nevertheless, efforts to secure convergence of the
existing agreements in order to form areas of larger
relative scale and measures to build up customs unions
continue to be pending issues, and the existing
institutions are still somewhat fragile.
In addition to trade itself, the future of regional
integration also clearly depends on the “depth” of the
corresponding agreements. In this era of globalization,
the space available for regional-level arrangements
depends on two different forces. The first of these is
the tendency towards the weakening of national
autonomy, which means that the efficacy of policies is
shifting to the regional or global levels. The second is
the relative weight, in these processes, of two factors:
i) the regional (rather than the global) scope of the
“public goods” that it is sought to promote; if they are
not of truly global scope, the principle of subsidiarity
would indicate that they should be handled at an
intermediate (regional) level; ii) the capacity of the
different institutions to generate a sense of “ownership”;
from this point of view, the subregional and regional
levels are at a marked advantage.
In macroeconomic and financial matters, the loss
of autonomy is obviously an ongoing process, so that,
as we already noted, there is a need not only for global
action, but also for arrangements at the regional level.
Possible coordination of macroeconomic policies could
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be a first area for action. Indeed, the demand for action
of this type has been heightened by the great
vulnerability of intra-regional trade to the recent
business cycles. However, the difficulties involved in
this process have been brought out clearly in the three
decades of experience accumulated by the European
countries in this field. In the short term, therefore, the
objectives in this respect should be relatively modest.
A measure which is highly complementary to the
foregoing would be the establishment of mechanisms
to coordinate policies for the prudential regulation and
supervision of financial systems. A desirable objective
in this field would be the development of mechanisms
for the mutual supervision of such policies and, perhaps,
the design of minimum standards which are more
specific than those of the Basle Rules. The fact that
some of the main international banks are operating in a
number of countries of the region further emphasizes
the importance of coordination in this area, in order to
secure more suitable regulation and supervision and to
avoid arbitrage by these banks between different
regulatory systems.
As emphasized in ECLAC (2001b), similar attention
should be given to the development of regional and
subregional financial institutions. In this respect, Latin
America and the Caribbean already possess important
assets in the form of a network of multilateral
development banks comprising the Inter-American
Development Bank, the Andean Development
Corporation, the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration, and the Caribbean Development Bank.
Furthermore, the experience already built up by the
Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR, formerly the
Andean Reserve Fund) opens up the possibility of
giving support to countries in crisis with extraordinary
resources of regional origin, either through significant
expansion of the membership and resources of FLAR,
or through mutual support arrangements (through
swaps) between Central Banks.
The advance of trade itself also creates a demand
for harmonization of the different regulatory schemes.
This includes harmonization of technical regulations
(including phytosanitary regulations), customs codes,
government purchasing standards, and those governing
the supply of services. Some progress has already been
made in some of these fields in the region. It is also
important to make similar progress in other fields,
especially as regards rules on competition and the
regulation of public utilities. With respect to the first-
named of these, it may be noted that there are reasons
for believing, on the basis of the experience of Europe,
that as common markets and an active process of intra-
regional investment become more firmly established,
regional agreements on competition, and the eventual
adoption of a common policy on competition, have
obvious advantages over rules on unfair competition
which apply solely to foreign trade. Among other things,
a framework of this type would also make it possible
to cope more effectively with possible anti-competitive
practices by big transnational corporations.
Furthermore, the considerable proportion of goods
with a high technological content in intra-regional trade
points to the possibility of joint action to develop the
corresponding sectors, but of course without the
rigidities of the old (and mostly unsuccessful) sectoral
complementation agreements. Such action should rather
form part of broader schemes to complement the efforts
being made in the field of technological research and
development, which should also serve as a means for
the transfer of technology to the relatively less
developed countries.
In the area of physical infrastructure, in addition
to developing harmonized rules on transport, energy
and telecommunications it is extremely important to
develop infrastructural networks conceived with a view
to regional and not solely national integration. The
development of infrastructure with this aim in view also
highlights the need to visualize spaces as common
rather than purely national. An interesting case in this
respect was the establishment in 1994 of the Association
of Caribbean States, in order to promote greater
cooperation in that subregion. Steps have also been
taken towards this type of objective in the case of
sustainable development, specifically of shared
ecosystems (the Amazon and Andean areas, or the
Mesoamerican Corridor) or river basins. The
establishment of various plans for border area
development is another example of the change caused
by integration.
Going beyond all this, there are also the immense
possibilities opened up by social and political integration.
The agreements on cultural matters and education –some
of them associated with the first stages of integration–
are only the first small step towards an integration agenda
centered on social development. The “democratic
clauses” of integration agreements and the various
forums in which the Heads of State of the region now
meet, together with the incipient subregional and Latin
American parliaments, are further examples of promising
initiatives on the broad agenda of political integration.
These considerations show that regional integration,
based on the principles of open regionalism, has a
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promising future whose actual materialization will
depend on the political will of the parties concerned.
Indeed, their ability to survive within a hemispheric free
trade area or within the process of globalization will
depend on their capacity to deepen their achievements
by further developing the agenda outlined above.
At all events, Prebisch’s categorical admonition
continues to be fully valid, not only in relation to trade
but also to the international economic (and political)
system as a whole: “There is an aspect of fundamental
importance to which the governments of the developing
countries have not paid sufficient attention. We have
not yet managed to break out of the isolation these
countries inherited from the old pattern of the
international division of labour. Thus, the greater part
of world trade has been among the centres themselves.
The trade of the developing countries has converged
on those centres, overlooking the enormous potential
of mutual trade, although it should be recalled that, ever
since its earliest days, ECLAC has vigorously advocated
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